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There are many arguments to believe that future
broad-based economic growth in the majority of
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries should and will
be based on agriculture. Factors such as trends in
demand and markets, production potential, compar-
ative advantages, path dependencies and the strong-
ly pro-poor nature of agricultural growth call for an
important role for agriculture in African growth in
the near and medium future.However,agriculture in
Africa will not develop automatically.In the past,the
sector has shown a deplorable performance in gen-
eral – SSA has lagged behind all other continents in
terms of food production dynamics. This is due to
over-taxation of the agricultural sector and/or
neglect by governments, donors, and subsequently,
the private sector including farmers. After decades
of exploitation and neglect,agriculture in SSA is in a
bad shape.
To unfold the potential of African agriculture under
unfavourable starting conditions, special efforts are
necessary,such as improving agriculture-linked insti-
tutions and organisations, investing in agriculture-
related public goods, and encouraging and support-
ing the private sector to invest in agriculture.
Intelligent agricultural policies are a precondition
for such efforts. The Comprehensive Africa Agri-
culture Development Programme (CAADP),one of
seven pillars of the New Partnership for Africa’s De-
velopment (NEPAD),is the most prominent attempt
to help design such intelligent agricultural policies.It
has many potentials which previous initiatives to
boost agriculture in SSA did not have, though the
challenges are still manifold.
The article is structured as follows. First, the argu-
ments for agriculture-based growth in SSA are
briefly outlined. Then, some key challenges to
achieve this type of growth are portrayed. Finally,
the structure, potentials and challenges of CAADP
to play an important role in boosting agriculture in
SSA are presented.
Arguments for agriculture-based growth in SSA
Agriculture is the basic pillar of the economies of
SSA. Today, 30 percent of GDP, more than 40 per-
cent of exports and around 70 to 80 percent of the
workforce rely on agriculture (World Bank 2007).
Even if structural transformation towards industry
and services will ultimately result in a decline of agri-
culture’s relative importance, this will not be possi-
ble without substantial growth of agriculture. The
opportunities exist.
Major agricultural demand and market trends
Worldwide market trends for agricultural products
are nowadays widely considered attractive; prices
are projected to be 10 to 20 percent higher than in
the past decade (OECD and FAO 2009). This is a
fundamental paradigm change from a few years ago
when it was generally assumed that the long-term
negative price trends and terms of trade against agri-
culture which prevailed for the last century or more
would continue. Several factors contribute to this
new prospect:
• Continuous population growth in developing
countries, urbanisation, increasing incomes and
changing dietary patterns in favour of animal
products steadily increases demand. It is assumed
that by 2050 world food production has to in-
crease by 70 percent until 2050 (FAO 2009b).
• Demand for biofuels seems to continue to rise,
despite more sceptical assessments concerning
their benefits for climate change and their effects
on food security than a few years ago. However,
scenarios of ambitious reduction of green house
gas emission predict an indispensable role for bio- * German Development Institute, Bonn.fuels, particularly in the transport sector (OECD
and IEA 2008).Even without political support for
biofuels, a high oil price (which is likely – for
instance, OECD and IEA (2008) is projecting a
crude oil price of about 100 USD/barrel in con-
stant terms even in low-carbon scenarios) will
drive demand for biomass upward, not only for
biofuels and bio-energy more generally but also
as a material substitute for mineral oil.
SSA will strongly contribute to the projected
increase in demand for agricultural products. Until
2050,its population is projected to more than double
to almost two billion (FAO 2009a). African cities
grow by five to six percent annually.
Resulting demand growth is favouring African pro-
ducers who have a favourable selling position due to
local preferences for and non-tradability of de-
manded food (e.g.local tubers and cereals) or due to
high transport costs of bulky and perishable prod-
ucts (e.g. meat, vegetables and fresh milk products).
Demand will gradually shift away from raw prod-
ucts towards more processed and convenient food,
more standardisation, more packaging and more
formal marketing channels, thereby encouraging
agro-industry and agro-business. The dimension of
the combined agricultural and agri-food sector in
developing countries is huge – low income house-
holds and countries devote a dominant proportion
of their income on food, and even in middle income
countries the combined contribution of both sectors
generally exceed 40 percent of GDP (Jaffee et al.
2003). Jaffee et al. (2003) also expect that the share
of agribusiness services and manufacturing in GDP
will rise to between 30 and 45 percent in the major-
ity of African countries.
At the same time, the economic support for agricul-
ture in industrial countries seems to have seen its
upper limits. Under pressure in international trade
negotiations and with fading national political back-
ing, support will increasingly be converted to less
production enhancing and trade distorting forms and
probably even decrease in absolute terms. This will
reduce artificial overproduction and raise world
market prices. Complete suppression of agricultural
support is calculated to increase world market prices
for important agricultural products by up to 20 per-
cent (Anderson et al. 2005). Thus, agricultural mar-
ket liberalisation would constitute an additional
incentive for farmers in developing countries,though
many African farmers would also suffer from prefer-
ence erosion.
Africa’s advantages for agriculture
Although the past track record of agriculture in
SSA is not very encouraging (see above),many SSA
countries have revealed comparative advantages for
agricultural production,and many more have poten-
tial advantages (OECD 2008; FAO 2009). Most of
the countries which do not dispose of mineral re-
sources have relied,and still heavily rely,on agricul-
ture for exports where some products have main-
tained considerable market shares – most important
are cocoa, coffee and cotton, followed by sugar, to-
bacco, tea, peanuts, natural rubber and bananas (Ng
and Yeats 2003). These successes are all the more
important as they are mostly achieved against de-
clining world market prices.Many of those countries
that do have mineral resources such as the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo,Angola,Sudan,Nigeria or
Zambia have huge untapped agricultural potentials.
SSA as a whole, together with South America, have
the largest land reserves,and many of these reserves
do not fall into (protected) forest areas (OECD and
FAO 2009). In the Guinea Savannah regions alone,
only 10 percent of 600 million hectares of cultivable
land are presently exploited (FAO 2009b).
The potential for increasing yields is also very high.
For instance, the gap between average maize yields
and yields achieved under good management condi-
tions on demonstration plots amounts to 250 to
500 percent in several African countries (World
Bank 2007).With improved low external input tech-
nologies, high yield increases can be achieved, too,
though at the expense of higher labour input. In
addition, SSA has a large untapped irrigation poten-
tial,at least in some regions,although information on
this are not very reliable.
In contrast,for non-agricultural products SSA seems
to have lost competitiveness. The share of manufac-
tures in GDP declined from 11 percent to 7.5 percent
between 1970 and 2006 (World Bank 2008). Except
for a few countries (like South Africa and Mauri-
tius), manufactures do hardly figure as exports.
Asian countries, notably China, have taken the lead
in manufacture exports since the 1960s, and at pre-
sent it is unlikely that SSA will gain back market
shares – Asia has substantially lower labour and cap-
ital costs (see World Economic Forum et al. 2009),
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while labour productivity is higher, infrastructure is
better and the industrial learning curve is steep.
Another indicator of the high comparative advan-
tage of SSA agriculture are world trade models
which, despite all contradictions in assumptions and
modelling details,consistently predict a considerable
increase in agricultural production in SSA under
free trade scenarios (Anderson et al. 2005). On the
other hand,light and heavy industries are forecasted
to shrink.
Pro-poor nature of agricultural growth
A last set of arguments in favour of agriculture as
the growth basis in SSA is the pro-poor nature of
agricultural growth compared to growth in other sec-
tors (World Bank 2007). This is due to several fac-
tors:about two thirds of the poor in SSA live in rural
areas, and despite rapid urbanisation the majority of
the poor will remain in rural areas for decades to
come (Ravaillon et al. 2007). Most forms of agricul-
ture,particularly in SSA,are very intensive in labour
relative to capital, much more than most industrial
sectors. Agricultural growth is mainly realised by
smallholder farmers and commercial producers with
a high intensity of unskilled labour. In addition to
these direct income and employment effects of agri-
cultural growth on poverty, indirect effects on the
local economy expressed in terms of the so-called
multiplier effects,are particularly high in SSA (up to
more than 4 in remote regions according to litera-
ture reviewed by Wiggins 2009), due to the resulting
demand increase for overwhelmingly local products
and services produced by other rural (poor) people.
Finally, the downward pressure on prices of local
(partially non-tradable) food items is a strong mech-
anism for poverty reduction in both rural and urban
areas (World Bank 2007).
Key challenges
Although, as the previous section argued, “African
agriculture is a sleeping giant” (OECD 2008, 7),
there are numerous obstacles to release this poten-
tial. The historic track record of African agriculture
is quite bad. Production may have grown in physical
terms, but less than in most other world regions, and
basically due to area expansion. Yields are stagnat-
ing and per capita production has declined over
decades (FAO 2009a). The models predicting com-
parative advantages are based on favourable as-
sumptions about supply elasticities which are mostly
adopted from other countries and are difficult to
achieve for African farmers. Most traditional export
crops have developed less dynamically than in other
world regions, and few new export crops have
emerged on a larger scale (Ng and Yeats 2003).
Modern agricultural technologies are lacking in most
areas: mechanisation is declining, green revolution
technologies have not spread except for a few spots
and crops, and fertiliser use is about 10 kg/ha com-
pared with 145 in Asia (World Bank 2007). De-
velopment of low-input technologies, probably well
adapted to ecological conditions in former times
(though this was not enough to prevent hunger),
could not keep pace with the growing population
density and ever reducing man/land ratio except in a
few areas where special circumstances converged.
Around 75 percent of the agricultural area suffers
from severe soil mining and fertility degradation
(FAO 2009a). SSA has converted from a food net-
exporting to a net-importing continent, and particu-
larly the growing urban population is strongly rely-
ing on imports for food security and for higher end
consumption.
This weak past performance is partially explained by
more or less immutable structural factors. These
include the prevalence of poor soils, ecological dis-
advantages and disease pressures, including difficult
conditions for animal husbandry and resulting prob-
lems of integrating agriculture and livestock.A par-
ticular problem is large variations and variability of
growing conditions in many parts of the continent,in
particular the absence of irrigation and water man-
agement.This is a major reason for the absence of a
green revolution in SSA, since Africa requires a
large number of crops to be improved and higher
profitability of technology to be adapted compared
to more stable conditions.High exposure to the risks
of climate change completes the natural problems of
African agriculture.
However, adverse natural conditions are not the
only largest problem of agriculture in SSA.
Examples for this assessment are the above-men-
tioned yield gaps which show that substantial yield
increases are feasible under on-farm conditions,
some success stories of modern technology spread
for individual crops such as cotton in West Africa,
maize in Southern and East Africa or tea and coffee
in Kenya (Wiggins 2009), and some regions of high
and sustainable productivity such as those analysed
in Burger and Zaal (2009).Other, more important reasons for the weak devel-
opment of agriculture in SSA are policy made.These
include a macroeconomic environment such as price,
trade and exchange rate policies which disfavour
agriculture (a common phenomenon in SSA until
the 1990s), and the neglect of rural infrastructure
and public goods such as roads, communication, cer-
tain types of irrigation or agricultural research (com-
mon since the 1990s). In addition, policies in SSA
have neglected and/or remained unsuccessful to cor-
rect for market failures since agricultural markets
and institutions are usually not working efficiently.
Transport, information, contract and other transac-
tion costs in rural areas are very high. Also the pri-
vate agribusiness needs appropriate support since it
is mostly informal (with a few but important excep-
tions mostly in South Africa, see OECD 2008) and
suffers from insufficient access to credit, informa-
tion, technology and support services.
A particular challenge for SSA agriculture is due
to the fact that most agricultural producers are
smallholder farmers.What has been said about pri-
vate agribusiness is true for this group of actors:
they lack capital, modern know-how, access to
finance, information and services. Smallholder
households pursue different, partially conflicting
production and consumption objectives at the
same time, with a high emphasis on reducing ele-
mentary survival risks. Without cooperation –
which is difficult to organise within the farming
community – smallholders cannot achieve econo-
mies of scale in procurement and commercialisa-
tion nor negotiate favourable conditions with input
and output traders (Collier and Decron 2009).
Consequently, they encounter difficulties in boost-
ing aggregate production and securing quality,
standards and regulations for both exports and
advanced local markets such as supermarket value
chains (see World Bank 2007; Wiggins 2009).
Smallholders constitute the largest group of the
poor in SSA, and many more are extremely vul-
nerable to poverty.
In partial summary, section one and two have
shown that the agricultural sector in SSA has a lot
of opportunities to boost African development
through agricultural-led expansion. However, short
and long-term perspectives of agricultural-led
development in SSA could be conceived different-
ly. Whereas there are good arguments that in the
short term agriculture is the best source of growth
and poverty alleviation, it is evident that in the
longer run the sector cannot offer enough income
and perspectives to keep most people in it.Industry
and services have to take over the lead.Agro-busi-
ness is an important transition sector, but it will not
develop automatically and requires support from
governments for markets, for farmers, for agribusi-
ness and for rural supporting institutions and
organisations. How fast transition can and should
occur, how to manage it, which sub-sectors, regions
and groups of people to support or to neglect is dif-
ficult to say, particularly in the absence of sound
information.Agricultural policy making under such
conditions poses difficult questions not only about
technical, ecological, economic and social issues,
but also political ones. There is no doubt that even
under democratic regimes, good governance and
with developmental orientation, to implement
long-term agricultural strategies under permanent
scrutiny of the electorate can be challenging for
African governments. Therefore, a promising agri-
cultural policy and long-term economic transition
has to be based on transparency, best available
information, continuous participation and owner-
ship, in other words – it requires good agricultural
policy processes.
CAADP as the most promising initiative to 
re-launch African agriculture
Currently, the most prominent and promising
attempt to improve agricultural policy process is
led by the New Partnership for Africa’s Develop-
ment (NEPAD).NEPAD is the economic program-
me of the African Union (AU), officially estab-
lished in 2001 (NEPAD 2001). It early recognised
both the importance of agriculture for development
and poverty reduction on the continent and the
weaknesses of member countries’ agricultural poli-
cies. It developed a special initiative, the Compre-
hensive Africa Agriculture Development Program-
me (CAADP) to improve agricultural policies on
the continent, based on the Maputo declaration
during the second ordinary summit of the AU
(NEPAD 2003). It is one of NEPAD’s seven broad
sector priorities.
CAADP has received considerable international
attention: for instance the G8 (Cale and Shaw 2009)
and the recent US initiative to support agriculture in
SSA (Clinton 2009) make strong reference on
CADDP. Some key aspects for any NEPAD initia-
tive geared to improving policymaking are:
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• broad participation in – and thus ownership of –
the development of policies and strategies,
• better harmonisation of these policies and strate-
gies and stronger efforts to embed them in
regional and pan-African agendas,
• evidence-based policymaking, including peer
learning and review, and 
• building partnerships to enhance private and pub-
lic investment.
These principles are in line with and grasped in
advance the new aid effectiveness agenda of the
international development community as enshrined
in the Paris Declaration 2005 (see http://www.aid-
harmonization.org). The underlying assumption of
CAADP is that improved policymaking processes
will lead to better policies and policy environments
including various aspects of governance;state capac-
ity to ensure effective planning, regulation, and ser-
vice provision; and eventually more and better pub-
lic and private investments.
African countries’ ownership is expected to distin-
guish the NEPAD initiatives from other ones. One
novel aspect of NEPAD initiatives is the increased
importance they attach to regional and continental
level organisations.This is an expression of the grow-
ing willingness and capacity of African countries to
collaborate at supra-national levels, as well as of the
realisation that national level processes can be use-
fully supported by regional and continental institu-
tions.In fact,continuing globalisation and open mar-
ket economy policies are increasingly exposing
African agriculture and food markets to internation-
al competition. Individual African nations are often
too small and weak to be able to act in isolation.The
establishment of AU/NEPAD as well as regional
organisations, most prominently the Regional
Economic Communities (RECs), is the most impor-
tant attempt of African nations to join forces in
order to be able to shape their own policy space and
to influence their fate in the world.
CAADP must be regarded more as a framework
than as a programme.Among the key elements are:
• Values and principles reflecting general NEPAD
principles (see above) that are expected to add
value to country processes,including changing the
quality of policy development and implementa-
tion, building of partnerships, dialogue, peer
review and mutual accountability at all levels,and
exploitation of regional complementarities.
• Four thematic pillars are recommended around
which agricultural strategies should be built: sus-
tainable land and water management, rural infra-
structure and market access, food security, and
agricultural research.
The two most tangible targets that the countries
have committed themselves to (in the framework
of the Maputo Declaration) are to allocate at least
ten percent of their national budgets to agriculture
and to achieve six percent agricultural growth. All
members of the AU are signatories to the Maputo
Declaration and thus expected to implement
CAADP.
After a first unsuccessful approach under the guid-
ance of the FAO, since 2005 a new approach was
designed,which takes CAADP principles more seri-
ously into account. Under the leadership of the
RECs, country processes are suggested that follow
certain steps: (a) taking stock of existing policies
and strategies in the country and modelling whether
they are adequate to achieve the CAADP objec-
tives, (b) developing strategies to fill any gaps iden-
tified, and (c) facilitating dialogue among various
stakeholders at a roundtable conference organised
to discuss policies and investment opportunities, to
develop partnerships, to harmonise development
assistance and to establish a framework for review
and accountability. The key output of a national
CAADP process is a document called the Compact,
which is signed during the roundtable by all groups
of stakeholders (including the ministry of finance)
and donors in agricultural policy and commits them
to implement the Compact. Beyond supporting
national processes, CAADP also involves regional
activities.
Up to mid-2009,only one Compact had been signed,
Rwanda, which was an atypical case. In the last few
weeks, eight other countries have concluded a first
CAADP round and about 15 more are close to
completion (see http://www.nepad-caadp.net).
Many countries have already increased their bud-
get contributions to agriculture since 2000, eight
have achieved or surpassed the CAADP target of
10 percent, but the continental average is only
about six percent, with the majority of countries
below five percent. The continent’s agricultural
growth rate surpassed the CAADP six percent tar-
get,reaching 6.5 percent in 2007.This is,however,at
least partially attributable to higher prices and not
to productivity increases (OECD and FAO 2009)and is,thus,most probably not due to CAADP or to
agricultural policies, reforms and investments more
generally.
It is premature to judge whether CAADP is really
achieving its targets and improving agricultural poli-
cies and their impacts in SSA.However,it is possible
to analyse the CAADP processes which are sup-
posed to lead to better policies. A research project
carried out by the German Development Institute
together with the International Food Policy
Research Institute (IFPRI) investigated the dynam-
ics and qualities of CAADP by conducting in-depth
case studies in countries where CAADP was
assumed to be concluded very early – Kenya, Ghana
and, to a lesser extent, Uganda (Zimmermann et al.
2009). By lack of concluded and implemented
Compacts, the study had to focus on the quality of
processes which would eventually lead to the com-
pacts, using participation, ownership and use of sci-
entific evidence as criteria to assess whether there is
a value added compared to past agricultural policy
processes.
The key conclusion of the study is that CAADP
indeed has the potential to add considerable value to
the way in which agricultural policies and strategies
are developed and implemented, and to increase the
emphasis placed on agriculture in development
strategies. Its origin in the pan-African movement
for stronger self-determination around African
Union and NEPAD in principle gives it an authority
which external initiatives cannot achieve. By and
large, however, the potential has not yet been real-
ized for various reasons:
• Its principles and values are not yet sufficiently
reflected in the implementation of the CAADP
agenda at the country level.The present CAADP
process design offers few opportunities for stake-
holders to participate and adds relatively little
new evidence. It is technocrat-driven with low
political leadership.
• If handled as a process separately from the
autochthonous agricultural policy cycles (as has
been the case in all case-study countries) which
in turn are linked to poverty reduction strate-
gies or other national strategic planning pro-
cesses, CAADP does not have the force to trig-
ger the changes it intends to do: it is barely
known by many agricultural stakeholders and
raises fears of duplication of efforts, distraction
of focus and even negative effects on agricultur-
al policy by key stakeholders as well as many
local donor representatives. Accordingly, na-
tional ownership is low, too, at least in the sur-
vey countries.
There are several reasons for this stated limitation
of CAADP. Partially, it is due to lack of financial
means and local capacities to implement the
process. But also the process design itself is weak.
There are communication gaps between CAADP
actors at various levels (continental, regional,
national) and between CAADP and the national
stakeholder community. It is unclear what align-
ment between CAADP and autochthonous policy
processes actually means and how it is to be
achieved. Important questions about sector capa-
bilities and absorption capacities are not posed.
The integration of agriculture and other natural
resource oriented policy fields is not achieved in
the field (though is part of the design). Overall, the
observed CAADP processes were of low intensity
and created only very limited stakeholder interac-
tions and interventions. In addition, several sup-
porting elements at the supra-national level fore-
seen by CAADP have not been effective: pillar
frameworks, pillar institutions, regional informa-
tion services and peer elements do not yet exist,
barely initialled or very weak.
However, due to its inherent potential CAADP is
worth being continued. To ensure that CAADP
proves successful, four particularly relevant needs
should be kept in mind:
• improved communication and information on the
nature and goals of and progress made on
CAADP, and more clear-cut definitions of the
roles of actors at the continental, regional and
national level,
• improved dovetailing of CAADP with ongoing
agricultural sector reform processes at national
level,
• improved integration of agricultural sector into
national reform processes, and
• more support by donors who have thus far taken
a wait-and-see stance,on the one hand on account
of the weaknesses pointed to above, and on the
other for fear of jeopardizing African ownership.
To be successful, reforms of this magnitude call for a
good measure of staying power. And in addition –
there are no reasonable alternatives visible to
CAADP.
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